Fernando Rosas, Alexander Boyd, Manuel Baltieri

Recent work proposes using world models to generate controlled virtual environments in which AI agents can be tested before deployment to ensure their reliability and safety. However, accurate world models often have high computational demands that can severely restrict the scope and depth of such assessments. Inspired by the classic `brain in a vat’ thought experiment, here we investigate ways of simplifying world models that remain agnostic to the AI agent under evaluation. By following principles from computational mechanics, our approach reveals a fundamental trade-off in world model construction between efficiency and interpretability, demonstrating that no single world model can optimise all desirable characteristics. Building on this trade-off, we identify procedures to build world models that either minimise memory requirements, delineate the boundaries of what is learnable, or allow tracking causes of undesirable outcomes. In doing so, this work establishes fundamental limits in world modelling, leading to actionable guidelines that inform core design choices related to effective agent evaluation.

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Evangelos Pournaras, Srijoni Majumdar, Thomas Wellings, Joshua C. Yang, Fatemeh B. Heravan, Regula Hänggli Fricker, Dirk Helbing

Voting methods are instrumental design element of democracies. Citizens use them to express and aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. However, voting outcomes can be as sensitive to voting rules as they are to people’s voting choices. Despite the significance and inter-disciplinary scientific progress on voting methods, several democracies keep relying on outdated voting methods that do not fit modern, pluralistic societies well, while lacking social innovation. Here, we demonstrate how one can upgrade real-world democracies, namely by using alternative preferential voting methods such as cumulative voting and the method of equal shares designed for a proportional representation of voters’ preferences. By rigorously assessing a new participatory budgeting approach applied in the city of Aarau, Switzerland, we unravel the striking voting outcomes of fair voting methods: more winning projects with the same budget and broader geographic and preference representation of citizens by the elected projects, in particular for voters who used to be under-represented, while promoting novel project ideas. We provide profound causal evidence showing that citizens prefer proportional voting methods, which possess strong legitimacy without the need of very technical specialized explanations. We also reveal strong underlying democratic values exhibited by citizens who support fair voting methods such as altruism and compromise. These findings come with a global momentum to unleash a new and long-awaited participation blueprint of how to upgrade democracies.

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