Self-organization can be broadly defined as the ability of a system to display ordered spatio-temporal patterns solely as the result of the interactions among the system components. Processes of this kind characterize both living and artificial systems, making self-organization a concept that is at the basis of several disciplines, from physics to biology to engineering. Placed at the frontiers between disciplines, Artificial Life (ALife) has heavily borrowed concepts and tools from the study of self-organization, providing mechanistic interpretations of life-like phenomena as well as useful constructivist approaches to artificial system design. Despite its broad usage within ALife, the concept of self-organization has been often excessively stretched or misinterpreted, calling for a clarification that could help with tracing the borders between what can and cannot be considered self-organization. In this review, we discuss the fundamental aspects of self-organization and list the main usages within three primary ALife domains, namely "soft" (mathematical/computational modeling), "hard" (physical robots), and "wet" (chemical/biological systems) ALife. Finally, we discuss the usefulness of self-organization within ALife studies, point to perspectives for future research, and list open questions.
Self-Organization and Artificial Life
Carlos Gershenson, Vito Trianni, Justin Werfel, Hiroki Sayama
Experiments show that evolutionary fitness landscapes can have a rich combinatorial structure due to epistasis. For some landscapes, this structure can produce a computational constraint that prevents evolution from finding local fitness optima — thus overturning the traditional assumption that local fitness peaks can always be reached quickly if no other evolutionary forces challenge natural selection. Here, I introduce a distinction between easy landscapes of traditional theory where local fitness peaks can be found in a moderate number of steps and hard landscapes where finding local optima requires an infeasible amount of time. Hard examples exist even among landscapes with no reciprocal sign epistasis; on these semi-smooth fitness landscapes, strong selection weak mutation dynamics cannot find the unique peak in polynomial time. More generally, on hard rugged fitness landscapes that include reciprocal sign epistasis, no evolutionary dynamics — even ones that do not follow adaptive paths — can find a local fitness optimum quickly. Moreover, on hard landscapes, the fitness advantage of nearby mutants cannot drop off exponentially fast but has to follow a power-law that long-term evolution experiments have associated with unbounded growth in fitness. Thus, the constraint of computational complexity enables open-ended evolution on finite landscapes. Knowing this constraint allows us to use the tools of theoretical computer science and combinatorial optimization to characterize the fitness landscapes that we expect to see in nature. I present candidates for hard landscapes at scales from single genes, to microbes, to complex organisms with costly learning (Baldwin effect) or maintained cooperation (Hankshaw effect). Just how ubiquitous hard landscapes (and the corresponding ultimate constraint on evolution) are in nature becomes an open empirical question.
Computational Complexity as an Ultimate Constraint on Evolution
Genetics, Early online March 4, 2019: 10.1534/genetics.119.302000
But adding artificial intelligence to our midst could be much more disruptive. Especially as machines are made to look and act like us and to insinuate themselves deeply into our lives, they may change how loving or friendly or kind we are—not just in our direct interactions with the machines in question, but in our interactions with one another.
The bots thus converted a group of generous people into selfish jerks.
Cooperation is still an important issue for both evolutionary and social scientists. There are some remarkable methods for sustaining cooperation. On the other hand, various studies discuss whether human deliberative behaviour promotes or inhibits cooperation. As those studies of human behaviour develop, in the study of evolutionary game theory, models considering deliberative behaviour of game players are increasing. Based on that trend, the author considers that decision of a person requires certain time and imposes a psychological burden on him/her and defines such burden as the cost of decision. This study utilizes the model of evolutionary game theory that each player plays the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with opponent players connected to him/her and introduces the cost of decision. The main result of this study is that the introduction of the cost of decision contributes to the evolution of cooperation, although there are some differences in the extent of its contribution regarding the three types of sparse topology of connections. Regarding the distribution of the cost of decision, especially in the case of the scale-free topology of connections, players with high cost of decision, which seem to be disadvantageous at first glance, sometimes become mainstream at the last.
Coevolution between the cost of decision and the strategy contributes to the evolution of cooperation
Scientific Reports volume 9, Article number: 4465 (2019) |