A Simple Rule For The Evolution Of Cooperation On Graphs And Social Networks

Complexity Digest 2006.22 - 08

May-29-2006

Web Cast :

6th Understanding Complex Systems Symposium

Urbana-Champaign, Il, 06/05/15-18
http://complexity.vub.ac.be/~comdig/06UCS/

A Simple Rule For The Evolution Of Cooperation On Graphs And Social Networks, Nature

Excerpts: It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. (...) Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, (...): natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.

Source: A Simple Rule For The Evolution Of Cooperation On Graphs And Social Networks
[ http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v441/n7092/full/nature04605.html ], Hisashi Ohtsuki, Christoph Hauert, Erez Lieberman, Martin A. Nowak, DOI: 10.1038/nature04605, Nature 441, 502-505, 06/05/25